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Abstract. We study how state-of-the-art neural networks for 3D ob-
ject detection using a single-stage pipeline can be made safety aware.
We start with the safety specification (reflecting the capability of other
components) that partitions the 3D input space by criticality, where the
critical area employs a separate criterion on robustness under perturba-
tion, quality of bounding boxes, and the tolerance over false negatives
demonstrated on the training set. In the architecture design, we consider
symbolic error propagation to allow feature-level perturbation. Subse-
quently, we introduce a specialized loss function reflecting (1) the safety
specification, (2) the use of single-stage detection architecture, and fi-
nally, (3) the characterization of robustness under perturbation. We also
replace the commonly seen non-max-suppression post-processing algo-
rithm by a safety-aware non-max-inclusion algorithm, in order to main-
tain the safety claim created by the neural network. The concept is de-
tailed by extending the state-of-the-art PIXOR detector which creates
object bounding boxes in bird’s eye view with inputs from point clouds.
1 Introduction
For perceiving the environment in automated driving, techniques for detecting
object presence in 3D have been predominantly implemented using deep neu-
ral networks. While state-the-the-art implementations for 3D object detection
achieve superior performance, for building trust over the created artifact, the
underlying engineering process should be safety-aware. Concretely, for certifi-
cation authorities, it is essential to demonstrate that the safety specification is
reflected in the design of the neural network and is aligned with the design of
the post-processing algorithm.
In this paper, we study how safety concepts can be integrated into engineering
3D object detection networks with single-stage detection. Our process starts by
defining the critical area and the associated quality attributes. Intuitively, the
critical area is the area nearby the ego vehicle where failed detection of an object
may lead to immediate safety risks. How one defines the critical area can be
dependent on the capability of the ego vehicle, such as maximum braking forces.
Apart from detecting the presence of objects, the quality of detection should also
be dependent on the safety characteristics of other components in the system
such as motion planners. For instance, some collision avoidance algorithms may
assign a fixed buffer around the bounding boxes (provided by the perception
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module as input) to perform planning. If the size of the real object exceeds the
predicted bounding box by the buffer size, physical collisions, although unaware
by motion planners, may appear. The separation of the critical area and the non-
critical area leads to the separation of the corresponding architectural design and
the definition of the loss function, where the subsequent design is guided by safety
for the critical area and but is driven by performance for the non-critical area.
We then restrict ourselves to the training and the post-processing pipeline, and
exemplify how a single-stage detection network such as PIXOR [19] and its post-
processing algorithm should be altered. For prediction in the critical area, we
adapt training techniques that incorporate feature-level perturbation, and define
a loss function over perturbed worst case, the label, and the allowed tolerance.
We also provide a mathematically proven bound to associate (i) the tolerance in
prediction-label difference and (ii) the required buffer to ensure that a prediction
contains the labeled bounding box. For post-processing, we use an alternative
non-max-inclusion algorithm, which intuitively enlarges the predicted bounding
box by considering other predictions on the same object with a slightly lower
probability. The use of non-max-inclusion is conservative, but it ensures that the
safety claims made in the neural network remain valid after post-processing.
By including this concept to the development process, one immediate benefit
is for certification authorities to obtain profound transparency regarding how
safety concepts can be demonstrated in the concrete design of neural networks
and the following post-processing algorithm. Our proposal does not prohibit the
use of standard training with commonly seen loss functions (e.g., mean square
error). Instead, one may use parameters trained with standard approaches as
initializing parameters; subsequently, perform parameter fine-tuning under spe-
cial loss functions that consider area-criticality and robustness. Our proposal
also does not prohibit the use of other further post-processing algorithms such
as utilizing time-series data, as in single-stage detection networks, non-max-
suppression is executed immediately on the output of the neural network, and
our proposal merely replaces non-max-suppression by a customized algorithm.
In summary, our primary contributions are (i) an exemplification of the
safety concept reflected into the architecture design and the corresponding post-
processing; (ii) a formally stated constraint associating the quality of the predic-
tion and the its effect on the interacting components such as planners; and (iii)
the extension of provable robustness into single-stage object detection networks.1
2 Related Work
There exist many novel neural network architectures that can perform object
detection from point clouds, inlcuding PIXOR [19], VeloFCN [9], PointRCNN [13],
Vote3Deep [4], among others. Our work starts with the idea of refining the PIXOR
system to make (i) the design of neurons, (ii) the design of the loss function, and
(iii) the immediate post-processing algorithm linked to requirements imposed
1 Due to space limits, we refer readers to the appendix for proofs of the lemmas and
our preliminary evaluation.
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from the safety argumentation and capabilities from other components. This
makes the overall system design driven by safety rather than by performance, in
contrast to existing design methodologies. For example, standard PIXOR only sets
the loss to zero when the prediction perfectly matches the label. Our extension
sets the loss to be zero, so long as the prediction is close to the label by a fixed
tolerance. This allows the loss to be overloaded on cases with perturbation, where
the perturbed input also leads to zero loss, so long if the produced output falls
into the tolerated bound. Another example is to use the non-max-inclusion post-
processing algorithm that enables to maintain provable guarantees in contrast
to the standard non-max-suppression algorithm.
For engineering robust neural networks, the concept in this paper is highly
related to the work of provably robust training [17,14,16,11,18,15,12]. While
current research results target simple classification or regression tasks, our focus
is to extend these results such that the technique scalably applies to single-stage
object detection neural networks that produce a vector of outputs on each grid.
Lastly, we are also aware of fruitful research results in safety certification of
machine learning components, with some focusing on safety argumentation [1,5,8,10]
while others on testing and formal verification (see [7] for a survey on results
in formal verification, testing, and adversarial perturbation). While these works
contribute to the overall vision of rigorous safety engineering of neural networks,
these results do not touch the construction of the neural networks. In this way,
our research well complements these results as we focus on constructing the
neural network (architecture and the loss function) and the immediate post-
processing algorithm such that they can reflect the safety argument.
3 Neural Networks and the PIXOR Architecture
A deep neural network is comprised of N layers where operationally, the
n-th layer for n ∈ {1, . . . , N} of the network is a function g(n) : Rdn−1 →
Rdn , with dn being the dimension of layer n. Given an input in ∈ Rd0 , the
output of the n-th layer of the neural network f (n) is given by the functional
composition of the n-th layer and the previous layers f (n)(in) := ◦(n)i=1g(i)(in) =
g(n)(g(n−1) . . . g(2)(g(1)(in))). Given input in, the prediction of the neural network
is thus f (N)(in). We use g
(n)
j to denote the j-th neuron in layer n, and for fully
connected layers, computing g
(n)
j is done by a weighted sum (characterized by
the weight matrix Wnj and bias bj) followed by applying a nonlinear activation
function ρnj , i.e., g
(n)
j := ρ
n
j ((
∑d(n−1)
k=1 W
n
jkg
(n−1)
k (in)) + bj). Note that such a
definition allows to represent commonly seen architecture variations such as
residual blocks or top-down branches that are used in PIXOR. Given a tensor v,
we use subscript v〈i,j〉 to extract the tensor by taking the i-th element in the first
dimension and j-th element in the second dimension. Lastly, define the training
set for the neural network to be T := {(in, lb)} where for every input in ∈ Rd0 ,
lb ∈ RdN is the corresponding label.
PIXOR [19] is a single-stage detector neural network that, based on the input
as point clouds, directly predicts the final position and orientation of an object.
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By single-stage, we refer to neural networks where there exists no intermediate
step of proposing possible areas (region proposal) in 3D for suggesting the poten-
tial existence of an object in the area. In this paper, we follow the original formu-
lation in [19] to only detect the presence of a “car” as in the KITTI dataset [6].
One can easily extend the network architecture to include other object types.
Fig. 1. Visualizing the relation between
grids and x-y coordinates. The bottom-left
grid has an index 〈0, 0〉, and its center point
is translated to the x-y coordinate equaling
(α
2
,− 11α
2
).
The input dimension d0 of the
PIXOR network is (L,W,H). Provided
that the positive direction of the x
coordinate facing in the front wind-
shield of the car, the positive direction
of the y coordinate facing to the left
of driver, and the positive direction
of the z coordinate facing up, each
in〈i,j,k〉 contains the density of the li-
dar point cloud centered at the point
(iα+ α2 , (j− W2 )α+ α2 , kα+ α2 ) with α
being the size of the grid. Figure 1 il-
lustrates how grids are mapped to the
physical 2D dimension.
The output dimension for the net-
work is dL = (
L
β ,
W
β , 7) with β
being the down-scaling factor. The
output f (N)(in)〈i,j〉, i.e., the out-
put at grid 〈i, j〉, is a 7 tuple
(pr, cos(θ), sin(θ), dx, dy, log(w), log(l)), where 〈i, j〉 is matched to the physical
area in 2D centered by point (iαβ + αβ2 , (j − W2β )αβ + αβ2 ) with αβ being the
size of the output grid. The output of the network essentially predicts, for each
grid in 〈i, j〉 in the 2D plane, if there is a vehicle nearby. In the original PIXOR
paper [19], the grid size α is set to 0.1 meter and β is set to 4, meaning that the
output grid has a physical quantity of 0.4 × 0.4 m2. Figure 2 shows the visual-
ization of the output relative to the center of the grid. One direct consequence is
that it is possible for multiple grids to create prediction over the same vehicle (as
the grid size is very small), by having a different displacement value dx and dy
to the center of the vehicle. Therefore, a post-processing algorithm called non-
max-suppression is introduced. The idea is to first pick the output grid whose
prediction probability is the largest while being larger than the class thresh-
old α. Subsequently, create the prediction as a bounding box, and remove every
prediction whose bounding box overlaps with the previously created bounding
box (for the same type) by a certain threshold, where the degree of overlapping
is computed using the intersection-over-union (IoU) ratio. For the example in
Figure 2, the vehicle prediction on the right will be neglected as the probability
(pr = 0.8) is less than the prediction probability from the left grid (pr = 0.9).
Note that such a post-processing algorithm, its computation is not integrated the
training and the inference of neural networks.
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Fig. 2. The output of the PIXOR network for a single grid; the red dot represents the
centering position of the grid. Both two grids have positive prediction on the existence
of the same vehicle.
4 Safety Goals and the Proposed Safety Arguments
Fig. 3. Understanding the quality of
prediction. The area of ground truth
that is outside the buffer of the col-
lision avoidance algorithm imposes
risk of collision.
We define the safety goal by first consid-
ering the critical area. Intuitively, a critical
area is an area where object detection should
be processed with care, as detection miss or
an object prediction of the wrong size may
lead to unsafe consequences. The precise def-
inition of the critical area and the associated
quality attribute can be driven by multiple
factors such as the specification of labeling
quality, the capability of motion planners,
and the capability of maximum breaking. In
the following, we create the following sample
specification and describe the underlying rationale.
(S1: Critical area) The critical area are output grids 〈i, j〉 where i ∈ [0, γL]
and j ∈ [W2β − γW , W2β + γW ]. Figure 1 shows an example where critical area
(in light yellow) is in grid 〈i, j〉 with i ∈ [0, 9] and j ∈ [3, 8].
(S2: Demonstrate no false negative in critical area) If there exists an ob-
ject in the critical area, it should be “detected”. The system may fail to detect
an object outside the critical area but there is no immediate danger (such as
hitting an object). The meaning of “detected” is detailed as follows: the pre-
dicted bounding box (of the vehicle) should deviate from the ground truth with
a fixed tolerance. In later sections, we provide the mathematical formulation
to quantify the meaning of tolerance in prediction.
– The rationale is that we assume that the collision avoidance algorithm
takes a fixed buffer in its planning, and it fully trusts the output of
the object detection. Therefore, any prediction that deviates from the
ground truth with an amount more than the tolerance can create the
risk for collision (see Figure 3 for an illustration).
– The “if” condition in the specification implies that safety constraint is
only on false negatives (undetected objects) and is not on false positives
(ghost objects). In other words, reducing false positives is a performance
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specification and (within the scope of this paper) is not considered as a
safety specification.2
(S3: High performance outside the critical area) For objects outside the
critical area, the prediction should achieve reasonable performance, but no
hard constraints are imposed.
Therefore, we employ two philosophies in designing the quality attributes for
object detection. Within the critical area, the quality attribute is safety-driven -
performance shall never sacrifice safety. This implies that a neural network that
creates tighter bounding boxes but may fail to detect an object in the critical
area is not allowed. Based on the specification, the training of neural networks
may reduce false positives that appeared inside the critical area, but it is only
a performance improvement. Outside the critical area, the quality attribute is
performance-driven - positives and false negatives are allowed for object detec-
tion outside the critical area. However, the training of neural networks may try
to reduce them. Lastly, in this example, we do not enforce perfection between the
prediction given input and the associated ground truth label. As demonstrated
in later sections, this is reflected by having a zero loss so long as the prediction
deviates from the ground truth by the tolerance.
Following the safety specification listed above, we are considering the follow-
ing safety arguments in the architecture design and post-processing to support
the key safety specification (S2). Note that the listed items are partial and can
be further expanded to create a stronger supporting argument.
(A1: Safety-aware loss function) The first argument is a careful definition
of a loss function that reflects the requirement listed above. In particular,
for critical and non-critical areas, different loss functions are applied.
(A2: Robust training for critical area) For generating predictions inside the
critical area, the second argument is to deploy specialized training mecha-
nisms such that one has a theoretical guarantee on robust prediction over
data used in training, provided that the robust loss has dropped to zero.3
(A3: Conservative post-processing) For post-processing algorithms that are
independent of the neural network but crucial to the generated prediction,
they should act more conservatively in the critical area.
5 Architecture Design, Loss, and Post-Processing
In this section, we detail how we extend the architecture of PIXOR to incor-
porate a safety-aware loss function, to integrate a new post-processing algorithm,
2 This paper targets automated driving systems (SAE J3016 level 3 and up); for ADAS
systems (SAE J3016 level 2) such as automatic emergency braking, false negatives
are less critical due to the driver taking ultimate control, but avoiding false positives
are considered to be safety-critical due to potential rear collision.
3 It is almost impossible to use standard loss functions while demonstrating zero loss,
as zero loss implies perfection between prediction and labels. Our robust training
and our defined robust loss can, as demonstrated in later sections, enable zero loss
(subject to parameters used) in practical applications.
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Backbone network Header network
Point 
cloud
(fixed parameters)
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𝑔𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑒
Object detection 
Fig. 4. Hardening a standard object detection network system (top) to a safety-aware
one that differentiates between critical and non-critical areas (down).
and finally, to apply robust training techniques. Recall that PIXOR has a back-
bone network gbackbone and a header network gheader. Intuitively, the backbone
network creates high-level features from high dimensional inputs, and the header
network produces predictions from high-level features.
We illustrate the proposed network architecture and the associated post-
processing pipeline in Figure 4. We start by training a standard PIXOR network
as a baseline model. It is tailored for optimal performance but is not safety-
aware. In the hardened neural network, we create two header networks gcritical
and gnon.critical, with both connected to the backbone network gbackbone. Param-
eters in gbackbone are fixed, i.e., they are not subject to further change. gnon.critical
is used to perform object detection for the non-critical area, and gcritical is used
to perform object detection for the critical area. In this paper, we present two
variations to engineer gcritical together with their associated theoretical guar-
antees. Lastly, for the critical area, a non-standard post-processing algorithm
(non-max-inclusion) is used rather than the standard non-max-suppression al-
gorithm which is used for non-critical areas.
(Engineering gnon.critical) For gnon.critical to perform object detection in non-
critical areas, it is created by taking gheader and subsequently, remove all neurons
in the final layer that generate predictions for critical areas. Naturally, such a
header network can be used for making predictions that are outside the critical
area. We do not perform further training to change any learned parameters.
5.1 Post-processing algorithm for the critical area (addressing A3)
For the post-processing in the critical area, we alternatively propose the non-
max-inclusion algorithm. The underlying idea is illustrated using Figure 5, where
a PIXOR network generates the prediction of the same object on two adjacent
grids. Standard non-max-suppression (Figure 5-b) picks the grid that produces
the largest prediction probability and suppresses other predictions with high
intersection-over-union (IoU); in Figure 5-b the bounding box with probability
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𝑝𝑟 = 0.9 𝑝𝑟 = 0.89 𝑝𝑟 = 0.9 𝑝𝑟 = 0.89 𝑝𝑟 = 0.9 𝑝𝑟 = 0.89
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 5. Explaining non-max-inclusion.
equaling 0.89 is suppressed. Nevertheless, as there is no ground truth in oper-
ation, it is uncertain which bounding box is correct. Therefore, a conservative
post-processing algorithm should include both bounding boxes, as demonstrated
in Figure 5-c. Overall, the non-max-inclusion algorithm proceeds as follows.
1. Sort all bounding boxes with their prediction probabilities (from high to
low), and store them to a list Lall. Remove all boxes whose probability is
lower than the class threshold α.
2. Remove from Lall the first bounding box B (i.e., the box with the highest
probability), and create a sub-list LB = {B} containing only B.
3. For each bounding box prediction B′ ∈ Lall, if the prediction B′ has high
IoU with the original bounding box B, remove B′ from Lall and add B′
to LB and do not consider it afterwards.
4. Finally, build the final bounding box Bˆ which contains all bounding boxes
of LB and use it as the final prediction for B.
5. Proceed to step 2 until Lall is empty.
5.2 Engineering gcritical - variation 1 (addressing A1)
In the following, we introduce the first variation for engineering gcritical address-
ing (A2), where we create gcritical by first taking gheader, followed by removing
all connections to final layer neurons that generate predictions for non-critical
areas. In contrast to gnon.critical, the parameters for weights and bias (from
gheader) will be further adjusted due to the newly introduced loss function.
(Loss function inside the critical area) For a labeled data (in, lb) ∈ T , we need
to define the loss for every output grid 〈i, j〉 that is inside the critical area, and
the overall loss is the sum of loss from each grid. In particular, the loss function
shall reflect the safety specification:
– If in the ground truth, there exists a vehicle centered at output grid 〈i, j〉,
then the loss for output grid 〈i, j〉 is 0 so long as
• for the 1st output prediction, i.e., the predicted probability, it is greater
than class threshold α, as the post-processing algorithm uses α as the
threshold, and
• for the k-th output prediction where k > 1, the distance between the
output and the label is bounded by δk.
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– If in the ground truth, there does not exist a vehicle centered at output grid
〈i, j〉, then loss for output grid 〈i, j〉 is 0 so long as
• the prediction probability is less than class threshold α, as for the post-
processing algorithm, it uses α as the threshold.
Definition 1 Let function dist(v, low, up) return the minimum distance between
value v to the interval [low, up]. That is, dist(v, low, up) := min(|v− low|, |v− up|).
The following definition of loss captures the above mentioned concept.
Definition 2 Given (in, lb) ∈ T , define the loss between the prediction out :=
f (n)(in) and the ground truth lb at output grid 〈i, j〉 to be
loss〈i,j〉(out, lb) :=
{
dist(out〈i,j,1〉, α,∞) + η if lb〈i,j,1〉 = 1
dist(out〈i,j,1〉,−∞, α) + η otherwise (lb〈i,j,1〉 = 0)
where η :=
∑7
k=2 dist(out〈i,j,k〉, lb〈i,j,k〉 − δk, lb〈i,j,k〉 + δk)
At the end of this section, we provide technical details on how to implement the
loss function using state-of-the-art machine learning framework PyTorch.
(Connecting zero loss with buffer size) To avoid scenarios shown in Figure 3,
the following lemma provides a conservative method to enlarge the predicted
bounding box, such that the enlarged bounding box guarantees to contain the
ground truth bounding box so long as the computed loss value loss〈i,j〉(out, lb)
equals 0.
Lemma 1. For the labelled data (in, lb) ∈ T , given out := f (n)(in), let θ be the
angle produced by out〈i,j,2〉 and out〈i,j,3〉. If loss〈i,j〉(out, lb) = 0 and if lb〈i,j,1〉 = 1,
then enlarging the prediction bounding box by
– enlarging the predicted width with d+ dw
– enlarging the predicted length with d+ dl
guarantees to contain the vehicle bounding box from label lb at grid 〈i, j〉, where
d, dl and dw need to satisfy the following:
– d >
√
(δ4)2 + (δ5)2,
– dl > maxα∈[−κ,κ] 12 (10
out〈i,j,6〉+δ6 sinα+ 10out〈i,j,7〉+δ7 cosα− 10out〈i,j,7〉),
– dw > maxα∈[−κ,κ] 12 (10
out〈i,j,6〉+δ6 cosα+ 10out〈i,j,7〉+δ7 sinα− 10out〈i,j,6〉),
and the interval [−κ, κ] used in dl and dw satisfies the following constraints:
∀α ∈ [−pi
2
,
pi
2
] : (| cos(θ)− cos(θ + α)| ≤ δ2 ∧ | sin(θ)− sin(θ + α)| ≤ δ3)
→ α ∈ [−κ, κ] (1)
A conservative computation of dl and dw independent of the generated pre-
diction can be done by further assuming the maximum length and width of
a vehicle for the observed output, e.g., a vehicle can have at most 6 meters
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in length (10out〈i,j,7〉 ≤ 6) and 2.5 meters in width (10out〈i,j,6〉 ≤ 2.5); the as-
sumptions shall be monitored in run-time to check if one encounters prediction
that generates larger vehicle bounding boxes. As δ2, . . . , δ7 are constants, and
by setting [−κ, κ] to be a constant interval (which is related to the value of δ2
and δ3)
4, the minimum value for dl and dw can be computed using numerical
approximation solvers such as Mathematica or Sage.
(Connecting the prediction and the post-processing algorithm) As a consequence,
given (in, lb) ∈ T , provided that loss〈i,j〉(out, lb) = 0 and lb〈i,j,1〉 = 1, one ensures
the following:
1. By enlarging the bounding box created from the prediction using Lemma 1,
the enlarged bounding box is guaranteed to contain the bounding box created
by the label.
2. The non-max-inclusion algorithm never removes any bounding box with pre-
diction probability smaller than α,
Therefore, the resulting list of bounding boxes after post-processing is guaranteed
to have one bounding box that completely contains the ground truth. This implies
that situation in Figure 3 does not occur in (in, lb).
(Problems in using standard post-processing algorithm) Notice that the above
mentioned guarantee does not hold when replacing non-max-inclusion with non-
max-suppression, as the enlarged bounding box from the prediction at 〈i, j〉
(which has the guarantee of containing the ground truth) can be removed, so
long as there exists another bounding box from a nearby output grid 〈i′, j′〉 that
(i) has higher predicted probability value (i.e., out〈i′,j′,1〉 ≥ out〈i,j,1〉) and (ii) has
a huge area overlap with the one from grid 〈i, j〉.
5.3 Engineering gcritical - variation 2 (addressing A1 and A2)
We propose an improvement for engineering gcritical which which considers
feature-level robustness, thereby also addressing A2. The underlying idea is
illustrated in Figure 6, where parameters to be learned are the same between
the first variation and the second variation. The difference lies in how values are
propagated in training (value propagation in variation 1 versus bound propaga-
tion in variation 2) and in how the loss is computed (loss accounting tolerance
in variation 1 versus symbolic loss accounting tolerance in variation 2).
4 The interval [−κ, κ] is essentially a conservative upper bound on the deviated angle
between prediction and the ground truth, where their associated sine and cosine
value differences are bounded by δ2 and δ3. As an example, if between the predicted
angle and the ground truth, we only allow the sine and cosine value to only differ by
at most 0.1 (i.e., δ2 = δ3 = 0.1), it is easy to derive that κ can be conservatively set
to pi
18
, i.e., (10◦), rather than the trivial value pi
2
. This is because an angle difference
of 10◦ can already make sine and cosine value differ by 0.15, thereby creating non-
zero loss. Therefore, conservatively setting [−κ, κ] to be [− pi
18
, pi
18
] in computing dl
and dw surely covers all possible angle deviation constrained by zero loss.
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Fig. 6. Introducing feature-level perturbation in engineering gcritical.
– (First layer in gcritical) For every neuron in gcritical receiving values pro-
duced from the backbone network, we require that it takes an additional
input parameter Ξ ≥ 0 that characterizes the maximum amount of per-
turbation, and subsequently computes a conservative bound accounting all
possible perturbation. Let n be the starting layer index of gcritical. Dur-
ing training, we require neuron gnj to compute, subject to the condition
−Ξ ≤ ξ1, . . . , ξd(n−1) ≤ Ξ, values lowerbnj and upperbnj where
• lowerbnj ≤ min ρnj (
∑d(n−1)
i=1 W
n
ji(g
(n−1)
i (in) + ξi) + b
n
j ) and
• upperbnj ≥ max ρnj (
∑d(n−1)
i=1 W
n
ji(g
(n−1)
i (in) + ξi) + b
n
j ).
In other words, the interval [lowerbnj , upperb
n
j ] acts as a sound over-approximation
over all possible computed values by taking input g
(n−1)
i (in) and by having
it boundedly perturbed.
– (Other layers in gcritical) For other layers, during training, a neuron takes the
bound computed by the previous layer and computes again a sound over-
approximation over possible outputs. In other words, during training, the
j-th neuron at layer n′ (n′ > n) computes lowerbn
′
j and upperb
n′
j such that
• lowerbn′j ≤ min ρn
′
j (
∑d(n′−1)
i=1 W
n
ji v
(n′−1)
i + b
n′
j ) and
• upperbn′j ≥ max ρn
′
j (
∑d(n′−1)
i=1 W
n
ji v
(n′−1)
i + b
n′
j ),
where for i ∈ 1, . . . , d(n′−1), lowerbn
′−1
i ≤ v(n
′−1)
i ≤ upperbn
′−1
i .
Here we omit technical details, but one can implement above mentioned
bound computation in state-of-the-art ML training framework using abstract
12 Chih-Hong Cheng
interpretation techniques such as dataflow analysis [3]. Using dataflow analysis,
under Ξ = 0 the computation turns exact, meaning that the lower-bound and
the upper-bound should collide, i.e., lowerbn
′
j = upperb
n′
j . In the rest of the paper,
we always assume that Assumption 1 holds. This implies that during inference,
one may set Ξ to 0 and can use the computed lower-bound as the prediction.
Assumption 1 Assume that when Ξ = 0, the computation of lowerbnj , upperb
n
j ,
lowerbn
′
j , upperb
n′
j for every input in ∈ Rd0 is exact, i.e., lowerbnj = upperbnj and
lowerbn
′
j = upperb
n′
j .
(Characterizing Robust Loss) During training, as each output is no longer a sin-
gle value but a bound incorporating the effect of perturbation, the loss function
should be adjusted accordingly. For simplifying the notation, for each output
at grid indexed 〈i, j〉, we add another dimension in the front to indicate the
lower and the upper bound. That is, use out〈1,i,j〉 and out〈2,i,j〉 for indicating the
computed lower- and upper-bound at grid 〈i, j〉.
Definition 3 At output grid 〈i, j〉, define the robust loss between the range of
possible values out (computed using perturbation bound Ξ and the input in) and
the ground truth lb to be
robust loss〈i,j〉(out, lb) :=
{
dist(out〈1,i,j,1〉, α,∞) + ηl+ηu2 if lb〈i,j,1〉 = 1
dist(out〈2,i,j,1〉,−∞, α) + ηl+ηu2 otherwise (lb〈i,j,1〉 = 0)
where
– ηl :=
∑7
k=2 dist(out〈1,i,j,k〉, lb〈i,j,k〉 − δk, lb〈i,j,k〉 + δk) and
– ηu :=
∑7
k=2 dist(out〈2,i,j,k〉, lb〈i,j,k〉 − δk, lb〈i,j,k〉 + δk)
The rationale for the design of robust loss is as follows: If the ground truth
indicates that there exists an object at grid 〈i, j〉, then we hope that any input
under perturbation should still reports the existence of that object. This is char-
acterized by the probability lower-bound out〈1,i,j,1〉 being larger than the class
threshold α. On the other hand, if the ground truth states that no object exists
at grid 〈i, j〉, then all possible input perturbation can report absence, so long
when the probability upper-bound out〈2,i,j,1〉 is less than the class threshold α.
Finally, when ηl and ηu are both 0, both the lower-bound and the upper-bound
due to perturbation are within tolerance. In other words, the perturbation never
leads to a prediction that exceeds the label by tolerance.
Under Assumption 1, robust loss〈i,j〉(out, lb) can be viewed as a generaliza-
tion of loss〈i,j〉(out, lb): When Ξ = 0, computing robust loss〈i,j〉(out, lb) essentially
computes the same value of loss〈i,j〉(out, lb) due to the colliding lower- and upper-
bounds (out〈1,i,j,k〉 = out〈2,i,j,k〉) making ηl = ηu.
Finally, given (in, lb) ∈ T , Lemma 2 (implicitly yet mathematically) charac-
terizes the allowed perturbation on in to maintain the prediction under tolerance.
If the symbolic loss at grid 〈i, j〉 equals zero and the label indicates the existence
of an object at grid 〈i, j〉, then any input in′ that are close to in (subject to
Eq. 2) should also positively predict the existence of an object (i.e., the first
output should be larger than α). The result can also be combined with Lemma 1
to avoid the situation illustrated in Figure 3.
Safety-Aware Hardening of 3D Object Detection Neural Network Systems 13
Function on single input Batched implementation in PyTorch
dist(v, low, up) torch.max(torch.clamp(low - v, min=0),
torch.clamp(v - up, min=0))
If lb=1 then x; torch.mul(lb, x) + torch.mul(1 - lb, y)
else (i.e., lb=0) y
Table 1. Implementing the loss function
Lemma 2. Given (in, lb) ∈ T , under the condition robust loss〈i,j〉(out, lb) = 0
where out is computed using in with perturbation bound Ξ := ξ (ξ > 0) at layer n,
then for any in′ where the following condition holds,
∀m ∈ {1, . . . , d(n−1)} : |g(n−1)m (in’)− g(n−1)m (in)| ≤ ξ (2)
the prediction out′ that is computed using in′ without perturbation (i.e., using
inference with Ξ = 0), is guaranteed to have the following properties.
(a) If lb〈i,j,1〉 = 1 then out′〈1,i,j,1〉 ≥ α.
(b) If lb〈i,j,1〉 = 0 then out′〈1,i,j,1〉 ≤ α.
(c) For k ∈ {2, . . . , 7}, |out′〈1,i,j,k〉 − lb〈i,j,k〉| ≤ δk.
(Implementing the Loss Function) As state-of-the-art neural network training
frameworks such as TensorFlow or Pytorch always operate on batches of data,
it is important that the previously mentioned loss functions can be implemented
with batch support. Overall, the loss function defined in Definition 2 and 3 is
a composition from two elements, namely (i) to apply Definition 1 and (ii) to
perform case split depending on the value of the label, which can only be 1 or 0.
Table 1 details how to implement these two elements in PyTorch.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we exemplified how to extend a state-of-the-art single-stage
3D detector neural network (PIXOR) in a safety-aware fashion. By safety-aware,
our goal is to reflect the safety specification into the architectural design, the en-
gineering of the loss function, and the post-processing algorithm. Our proposed
hardening is compatible with standard training methods while being comple-
mentary to other critical activities in the safety engineering of machine learning
systems such as rigorous data collection, testing (for understanding the gener-
alizability) or interpretation (for understanding the decision of networks). In
our example, the tolerance concept integrated inside the loss function avoids
unrealistic-and-unreachable perfection in training, allows integrating the idea of
provable robustness, and finally, enables connecting the specification to capabil-
ities or limitations from other components such as motion planners.
For future work, we are interested in migrating the concept and the research
prototype into real systems, as well as reflecting other safety specifications into
the design of the architecture and the loss function. Yet another direction is
to consider how other architectures used in multi-view 3D reconstruction (e.g.,
MV3D network [2]) can also be made safety-aware.
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Appendix (Proofs and Evaluation)
A. Proofs
Lemma 1. For the labelled data (in, lb) ∈ T , given out := f (n)(in), let θ be the
angle produced by out〈i,j,2〉 and out〈i,j,3〉. If loss〈i,j〉(out, lb) = 0 and if lb〈i,j,1〉 = 1,
then enlarging the prediction bounding box by
– enlarging the predicted width with d+ dw
– enlarging the predicted length with d+ dl
guarantees to contain the vehicle bounding box from label lb at grid 〈i, j〉, where
– d >
√
(δ4)2 + (δ5)2,
– dl > maxα∈[−κ,κ] 12 (10
out〈i,j,6〉+δ6 sinα+ 10out〈i,j,7〉+δ7 cosα− 10out〈i,j,7〉),
– dw > maxα∈[−κ,κ] 12 (10
out〈i,j,6〉+δ6 cosα+ 10out〈i,j,7〉+δ7 sinα− 10out〈i,j,6〉),
and the interval [−κ, κ] used in dl and dw satisfies the following constraints:
∀α ∈ [−pi
2
,
pi
2
] : (| cos(θ)− cos(θ + α)| ≤ δ2 ∧ | sin(θ)− sin(θ + α)| ≤ δ3)
→ α ∈ [−κ, κ] (3)
Proof. As lb〈i,j,1〉 = 1, the label indicates the existence of vehicle at output grid
〈i, j〉. As loss〈i,j〉(out, lb) = 0, following the definition of loss〈i,j〉 we obtain η = 0,
meaning that for every k ∈ [2, 7], dist(out〈i,j,k〉, lb〈i,j,k〉−δk, lb〈i,j,k〉+δk) = 0, i.e.,
every out〈i,j,k〉 only deviates by lb〈i,j,k〉 with maximum amount δk.
To compute the required buffer, we consider (1) the effect of prediction de-
viation in terms of the center position of the vehicle (i.e., dx for out〈i,j,4〉 and dy
for out〈i,j,5〉), and (2) the effect of scaling and rotation. Effects (1) and (2) are
independent, so the total required buffer is the sum of individual contributions
from (1) and (2). An illustration can be found in Figure 7.
– For (1), as demonstrated in Figure 7-a, the deviation in dx, i.e., |out〈i,j,4〉 −
lb〈i,j,4〉|, is bounded by δ4 due to zero loss. Similarly, the deviation in dy
is bounded by δ5. For the prediction to contain the bounding box, it suf-
fices to enlarge both the length and the width by at least the distance of
displacement, i.e., d ≥√(δ4)2 + (δ5)2.
– For (2), under the condition of zero loss, it suffices to consider the length and
the width of the ground truth to be the largest possible, i.e., in the ground
truth, the length of the vehicle equals L = 10out〈i,j,7〉+δ7 and the width of
the vehicle W = 10out〈i,j,6〉+δ6 . Illustrated in Figure 7-b, if the angle between
the prediction and the ground truth equals α,
• the length for the outer green rectangle equals L cosα+W sinα, and
• the width for the outer green rectangle equals L sinα+W cosα.
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Fig. 7. Understanding the required buffer size.
To find the size of the required buffer, we need to at least consider every
possible angle deviation α that still creates zero loss. Equation 3 stated in
the lemma provides such a characterization5.
Therefore, dl, the length to be enlarged in the result bounding box under
rotation and size expansion, should be larger than half of L cosα+W sinα
subtracted by the originally predicted size 10out〈i,j,7〉 , which equals
maxα∈[−κ,κ]
1
2
(10out〈i,j,6〉+δ6 sinα+ 10out〈i,j,7〉+δ7 cosα− 10out〈i,j,7〉).
The computation for dw is analogous and is omitted here.
uunionsq
Lemma 2. Given (in, lb) ∈ T , under the condition robust loss〈i,j〉(out, lb) = 0
where out is computed using in with perturbation bound Ξ := ξ (ξ > 0) at layer n,
then for any in′ where the following condition holds,
∀m ∈ {1, . . . , d(n−1)} : |g(n−1)m (in’)− g(n−1)m (in)| ≤ ξ (4)
the prediction out′ that is computed using in′ without perturbation (i.e., using
inference with Ξ = 0), is guaranteed to have the following properties.
(a) If lb〈i,j,1〉 = 1 then out′〈1,i,j,1〉 ≥ α.
(b) If lb〈i,j,1〉 = 0 then out′〈1,i,j,1〉 ≤ α.
(c) For k ∈ {2, . . . , 7}, |out′〈1,i,j,k〉 − lb〈i,j,k〉| ≤ δk.
5 The interval [−κ, κ] is essentially a conservative upper bound on the deviated angle
between prediction and the ground truth, where their associated sine and cosine
value differences are bounded by δ2 and δ3. As an example, if between the predicted
angle and the ground truth, we only allow the sine and cosine value to only differ by
at most 0.1 (i.e., δ2 = δ3 = 0.1), it is easy to derive that κ can be conservatively set
to pi
18
, i.e., (10◦), rather than the trivial value pi
2
. This is because an angle difference
of 10◦ can already make sine and cosine value differ by 0.15, thereby creating non-
zero loss. Therefore, conservatively setting [−κ, κ] to be [− pi
18
, pi
18
] in computing dl
and dw surely covers all possible angle deviation constrained by zero loss.
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Proof. (Sketch) Here we provide the proof for (a); for (b) and (c) the argument is
analogous. First we recall Assumption 1 which states that when Ξ is set to 0, the
bound computation is exact and the computed lower- and upper-bound collide,
i.e., for any input in′, we have out′〈1,i,j〉 = out
′
〈2,i,j〉 and we can use out
′
〈1,i,j〉 to be
the result of prediction.
When an input in′ satisfies the constraint stated in Eq. 4, the corresponding
output out′〈1,i,j〉 where Ξ is set to 0, is contained in the lower- and upper-bound
of out which is computed using in with Ξ being set to ξ. As robust loss〈i,j〉(out, lb)
equals 0, when lb〈i,j,1〉 = 1 the predicted probability lower-bound is always larger
or equal to α. Therefore, out′〈1,i,j,1〉, being contained in the lower- and upper-
bound, is also larger or equal to α. uunionsq
B. Evaluation
In this section, we provide a summary of our initial evaluation under PIXOR and
the KITTI dataset, following the original paper [19]. The evaluation using KITTI
dataset in this paper is for knowledge dissemination and scientific publication
and is not for commercial use.
(Understanding the effect of non-max-inclusion) We have implemented the non-
max-suppression algorithm to understand the effect in KITTI dataset. To create
a bounding box that contains all predictions, in our prototype implementation
(admittedly non-optimal), we enlarge the length of the bounding box from lbox
to lbox(1.05)
i and the width from wbox to wbox(1.1)
i, where i is iterated from 1
until all related prediction can be included. In Figure 8-a, one sees the bounding
boxes with the largest prediction probability (blue) and their enlarged version
(in green). Figure 8-b demonstrates all predicted bounded boxes that are being
included; as multiple blue rectangles are imperfectly overlaid due to variations in
size and position, the resulting blue lines looks thicker. As for PIXOR the grid size
is actually very small (0.4× 0.4m2), for predicting a single vehicle there can be
up to 20 bounding boxes that require to be included. For the enlarged bounding
box of a vehicle, the width may require a 60% increase, while the length may
require a 30% increase.
(New loss function with tolerance and robust training) We have conducted an
initial experiment for understanding the effect of the new loss function and robust
training. In the following, we explain in detail how the evaluation is conducted.
We use the open-source version of PIXOR available at the following website
https://github.com/ankita-kalra/PIXOR as the baseline for experimenting
the concept. In the original implementation, the geometrical information regard-
ing the input and output is stored in the data structure geometry = {’L1’:
-40.0, ’L2’: 40.0, ’W1’: 0.0, ’W2’: 70.0, ’H1’: -2.5, ’H2’: 1.0,
’input shape’: (800, 700, 36),’label shape’: (200, 175, 7)}. We have
created the following modified configuration to consider the critical area. geometry
= {’L1’: -15.0, ’L2’: 15.0, ’W1’: 0.0, ’W2’: 30.0, ’H1’: -2.5, ’H2’:
1.0, ’input shape’: (300, 300, 36), ’label shape’: (75, 75, 7)}. The
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Fig. 8. Using non-max-inclusion with PIXOR.
considered critical area only produces a 2D output grid with size 75× 75, apart
from the original setup that produces 200×175. This also influences the decoder
from the generated result, where self.geometry (for interpreting the output)
is also correspondingly set to [-15.0, 15.0, 0.0, 30.0] (for x and y coordi-
nate, it spans from −15 m to 15 m and from 0 m to 30 m. With a grid size
of 0.4, it creates 15−(−15)0.4 × 30−(0)0.4 = 75 × 75 in the output grid, matching the
’label shape’ attribute). This overall enables a training using a single GPU
with 11 GB memory, operated with a batch of 24.
For the robust training, in the network the symbolic perturbation is enabled
at 3 layers before the output is produced. We allow using batch normalization
before the layer where symbolic error is introduced. The following code snip-
pet demonstrates the required modification for the header network for forward
reasoning, where a perturbation bound Ξ = 0.001 is used in training. One can
integrate this code snippet to the network and use correspondingly the post-
processing algorithm.
def forward(self, x):
xi = 0
if self.training :
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xi = 0.001
x = self.conv1(x)
if self.use_bn:
x = self.bn1(x)
x = self.conv2(x)
if self.use_bn:
x = self.bn2(x)
# Add the perturbation bound such that value changes to
# [l_o2, u_o2] = [x - xi, x + xi].
# When xi = 0, l_o2 = u_o2, and the computation below ensures that
# l_o3 = u_o3, and l_o4 = u_o4
l_o2 = x - xi
u_o2 = x + xi
# ReLU over conv3, symbolic version
l_o3 = (nn.functional.conv2d(l_o2, self.conv3.weight.clamp(min=0), bias=None,
stride=self.conv3.stride, padding=self.conv3.padding,
dilation=self.conv3.dilation, groups=self.conv3.groups) +
nn.functional.conv2d(u_o2, self.conv3.weight.clamp(max=0), bias=None,
stride=self.conv3.stride, padding=self.conv3.padding,
dilation=self.conv3.dilation, groups=self.conv3.groups) +
self.conv3.bias[None,:,None,None])
u_o3 = (nn.functional.conv2d(u_o2, self.conv3.weight.clamp(min=0), bias=None,
stride=self.conv3.stride, padding=self.conv3.padding,
dilation=self.conv3.dilation, groups=self.conv3.groups) +
nn.functional.conv2d(l_o2, self.conv3.weight.clamp(max=0), bias=None,
stride=self.conv3.stride, padding=self.conv3.padding,
dilation=self.conv3.dilation, groups=self.conv3.groups) +
self.conv3.bias[None,:,None,None])
# ReLU over conv4, symbolic version
l_o4 = (nn.functional.conv2d(l_o3, self.conv4.weight.clamp(min=0), bias=None,
stride=self.conv4.stride, padding=self.conv4.padding,
dilation=self.conv4.dilation, groups=self.conv4.groups) +
nn.functional.conv2d(u_o3, self.conv4.weight.clamp(max=0), bias=None,
stride=self.conv4.stride, padding=self.conv4.padding,
dilation=self.conv4.dilation, groups=self.conv4.groups) +
self.conv4.bias[None,:,None,None])
u_o4 = (nn.functional.conv2d(u_o3, self.conv4.weight.clamp(min=0), bias=None,
stride=self.conv4.stride, padding=self.conv4.padding,
dilation=self.conv4.dilation, groups=self.conv4.groups) +
nn.functional.conv2d(l_o3, self.conv4.weight.clamp(max=0), bias=None,
stride=self.conv4.stride, padding=self.conv4.padding,
dilation=self.conv4.dilation, groups=self.conv4.groups) +
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self.conv4.bias[None,:,None,None])
if self.training == True :
# In training mode, produce min and max
# (will be further processed by post-processor)
cls_min = torch.sigmoid(self.clshead(l_o4))
reg_min = self.reghead(l_o4)
cls_max = torch.sigmoid(self.clshead(u_o4))
reg_max = self.reghead(u_o4)
return cls_min, reg_min, cls_max, reg_max
else:
# In inference mode, as xi is set to 0, just use lower bound as result
cls = torch.sigmoid(self.clshead(l_o4))
reg = self.reghead(l_o4)
return cls, reg
We started with a network trained using the loss defined in [19] that is also
implemented in the above mentioned public github repository. One observes
that for some models, when setting Ξ = 0.001, α = 0.5 (class threshold) and
δk = 0.01 (k ∈ {2, . . . , 7}, tolerance in each prediction), the computed robust loss
is already 0. This means that the network has an inherent tolerance of over
perturbation, if the amount of adversarial perturbation reflected on the feature-
level is very small (Ξ = 0.001). Here we omit further explanations, but one can
surely increase the value of Ξ in order to adjust the parameters of the network
to be more robust against perturbation.
